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In this online appendix, we extend our model and results to incorporate (i) more than 2 products (part A)
and (ii) preference of loyal customers (part B). All proofs are given in part C. Where necessary, we provide
detailed expressions so that other researchers can follow each step of the extensions.
Appendix A: Extension to Multiple Product
We first show the extension of the demand curve to multiple products by first considering the simplest
scenario involving 3 products and 2 customers. We then extend the demand curve involving 3 customers to
demonstrate the notion of symmetric predisposition distributions for each product. Finally we will extend
our logic to 3 products with continuous mass of consumer, and show the equilibrium market outcomes when
3 products are engaged in symmetric competition. This result is applicable to n products.
A.1. 3 products and 2 customers
There are three products, A, B, and C, each characterized fully by price-quality pairs (pA, qA), (pB, qB),
(pC , qC) respectively. There are two customers, 1 and 2, each with different predisposition towards each of the
three products. Customer 1’s predisposition to products A, B, and C are respectively, Ω1A, Ω1B, and Ω1C .
Customer 2’s predisposition to products A, B, and C are respectively, Ω2A, Ω2B, and Ω2C . The ambiguity in
the product market environment is given by ξ > 0. According to the multi-attribute utility model, customer
i∈ {1,2} derives utility from product j ∈ {A,B,C},
v(pj , qj ,Ωij , ξ) = qj − pj −Ωijξ.
Because we adopt the convention of subtracting the predisposition, smaller values of Ωij represent stronger
predisposition. For example, Ω1A − Ω1B < 0 indicates that customer 1 is more favorably predisposed to
product A than B. Customer i∈ {1,2} will purchase product A if and only if
qA− pA−ΩiAξ > qB − pB −ΩiBξ, and qA− pA−ΩiAξ > qC − pC −ΩiCξ
⇔ (qA− qB)− (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ > (pA− pB) and (qA− qC)− (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ > (pA− pC)
⇔ pA < (qA− qB) + pB − (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ and pA < (qA− qC) + pC − (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ
⇔ pA <min{(qA− qB) + pB − (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ}.
Similarly, customer i∈ {1,2} will not purchase product A if and only if
qA− pA−ΩiAξ < qB − pB −ΩiBξ, or qA− pA−ΩiAξ < qC − pC −ΩiCξ
1
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⇔ (qA− qB)− (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ < (pA− pB) or (qA− qC)− (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ < (pA− pC)
⇔ pA > (qA− qB) + pB − (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ or pA > (qA− qC) + pC − (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ
⇔ pA >min{(qA− qB) + pB − (ΩiA−ΩiB)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (ΩiA−ΩiC)ξ}.
Writing out for each customers 1 and 2, the demand for product A, which can take values 0, 1, or 2 is given
as follows.
DA(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pA >min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω1A−Ω1B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω1A−Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω2A−Ω2B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω2A−Ω2C)ξ},
1, if pA <min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω1A−Ω1B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω1A−Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω2A−Ω2B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω2A−Ω2C)ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω1A−Ω1B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω1A−Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω2A−Ω2B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω2A−Ω2C)ξ},
2, if pA <min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω1A−Ω1B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω1A−Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA− qB) + pB − (Ω2A−Ω2B)ξ, (qA− qC) + pC − (Ω2A−Ω2C)ξ}.
If pA is relatively low, both customers 1 and 2 would purchase product A, so DA = 2. As pA increases,
the demand falls to 1. The customer that defected would either purchase product B or C, depending on
that customer’s predisposition levels ΩiB and ΩiC . Therefore, unlike the two-product case, the demand for
product B is no longer 2-(demand for A) because of the existence of product C. Demand for product B and
C are respectively,
DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ},
1, if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ},
2, if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA− (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ};
DC(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ
}
, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ},
1, if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ},
– or –
if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ},
2, if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA− (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}.
As expected, all demand for product is decreasing in its price. We examine the resulting demand function
using a simple example next.
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Example A-1. For simplicity, assume symmetric qualities qA = qB = qC . Moreover, assume that customer
1 is most favorably predisposed to A, then B, then C, i.e., Ω1A <Ω1B <Ω1C , while customer 2 has the reverse
predisposition, Ω2C <Ω2B <Ω2A. For simplicity of illustration, assume that
Ω1A =−1<Ω1B = 0<Ω1C = 1, and Ω2C =−1<Ω2B = 0<Ω2A = 1.
Then, the demand expression for A simplifies to,
DA(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ} and pA >min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ},
1, if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ} and pA >min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ} and pA <min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ},
2, if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ} and pA <min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ}.
=

0, if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ},
1, if min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ}< pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}
2, if pA <min{pB − ξ, pC − 2ξ}.
Similarly, the demand expression for C simplifies to,
DC(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ} and pC >min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ},
1, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ} and pC >min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ},
– or –
if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ} and pC <min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ},
2, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ} and pC <min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ}.
=

0, if pC >min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ},
1, if min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}< pC <min{pA + 2ξ, pB + ξ}
2, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}.
We notice that as ambiguity ξ increases, the price range for which DA = 1 and DC = 1 becomes larger.
In other words, the demand for product A becomes price insensitive (or sticky) at DA = 1, and demand for
product C becomes price insensitive (or sticky) at DC = 1. This is because customer 1 will stick to purchasing
product A (his/her most favorably predisposed product) while customer 2 will stick to purchasing product
C (his/her most favorably predisposed product). What happens to product B? The demand expression for
B is,
DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ} and pB >min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ},
1, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ} and pB >min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ}, ,
– or –
if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ} and pB <min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ},
2, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ} and pB <min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ}.
We have three cases depending on the values of pA and pC .
(i) if pA < pC : DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ},
1, if pA− ξ < pB <min{pA + ξ, pC − ξ},
2, if pB < pA− ξ.
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(ii) if pA = pC : DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB > pA− ξ,
1, if pB = pA− ξ,
2, if pB < pA− ξ.
(iii) if pC ≤ pA : DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ},
1, if pC − ξ < pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ},
2, if pB < pC − ξ.
Without loss of generality, let’s take the first case where pA < pC . As ambiguity ξ increases, the region
where DB = 1 increases only if pA + ξ < pC − ξ, or when pC >> pA. In other words, when price of product C
is exorbitantly high, with more ambiguity, customer 2 who is most favorably predisposed to C will settle for
B instead. When this is not the case, increasing ambiguity ξ decreases the region of prices pB where DB = 2
and increases the the region of prices pB where DB = 0, while maintaining the constant region of prices pB
where DB = 1.
The asymmetric effect of ξ on the three demand curves occurred because while the products were sym-
metric in their qualities, qA = qB = qC , they were asymmetric on the consumer predispositions. That is,
only 2 products (A and C) had most favorably predisposed customers, while product B had both neutrally
predisposed customers. 
We next show that having three equal quality products and three customers with predispositions equally
diversified among three products results in three symmetric demand curves.
A.2. 3 products and 3 customers
There are now 3 customers, 1, 2, and 3. Extending the demand functions from the previous section to take
values 0,1,2, and 3, we have:
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DA(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ}
1, if pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
2, if pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ},
3, if pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω1A −Ω1B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω1A −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω2A −Ω2B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω2A −Ω2C)ξ} and
pA <min{(qA − qB) + pB − (Ω3A −Ω3B)ξ, (qA − qC) + pC − (Ω3A −Ω3C)ξ};
DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
1, if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ
}
, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
2, if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ},
3, if pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω1B −Ω1A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω1B −Ω1C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω2B −Ω2A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω2B −Ω2C)ξ}, and
pB <min{(qB − qA) + pA − (Ω3B −Ω3A)ξ, (qB − qC) + pC − (Ω3B −Ω3C)ξ};
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DC(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
1, if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
2, if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ
}
, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
– or –
if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}
3, if pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω1C −Ω1A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω1C −Ω1B)ξ}, and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω2C −Ω2A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω2C −Ω2B)ξ} and
pC <min{(qC − qA) + pA − (Ω3C −Ω3A)ξ, (qC − qB) + pB − (Ω3C −Ω3B)ξ}.
Example A-2. For simplicity, we take the products to be symmetric in quality, i.e., qA = qB = qC .
Notice that each customer i ∈ {1,2,3} has three predisposition quantities ΩiA, ΩiB, and ΩiC , whose 3
pair-wise differences determines their purchase choice. We assume the following inequality:
Ω1A =−1<Ω1B = 0<Ω1C = 1,
Ω2B =−1<Ω2C = 0<Ω2A = 1,
Ω3C =−1<Ω3A = 0<Ω3B = 1.
In other words, customer 1 is most favorably predisposed to A, followed by B, then C. Customer 2 is most
favorably predisposed to B, followed by C, then A. Customer 3 is most favorably predisposed to C, followed
by A, then B. This is symmetric in the sense that each product has exactly 1 most favorably predisposed,
and also exactly 1 second- and exactly 1 least favorably predisposed customers. Moreover, the magnitude of
the difference in predispositions are also identical,
Ω1A−Ω1B =−1 ; Ω2A−Ω2B = 2 ; Ω3A−Ω3B =−1 ;
Ω1A−Ω1C =−2 ; Ω2A−Ω2C = 1 ; Ω3A−Ω3C = 1 ;
Ω1B −Ω1C =−1 ; Ω2B −Ω2C =−1 ; Ω3B −Ω3C = 2 .
Plugging in these values, the demand expressions above simplify to
Authors’ names blinded for peer review
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DA(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA >min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA >min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ}
1, if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA >min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA >min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA <min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA >min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA >min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA <min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
2, if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA <min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA >min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
– or –
if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA >min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA <min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
– or –
if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA <min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}, pA <min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
3, if pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, pA <min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ} pA <min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ}
DB(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
1, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
2, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min
{
pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
– or –
if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB >min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
– or –
if pB >min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ},
3, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ}, pB <min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ};
DC(pA, pB , pC) =

0, if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
1, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
2, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
– or –
if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC >min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
– or –
if pC >min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}
3, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}, pC <min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ} pC <min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ}.
Further simplifications result in the following symmetric demand expressions:
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DA(pA, pB, pC) =

0, if pA >min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ},
1, if min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ}< pA <min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ},
2, if min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}< pA <min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ},
3, if pA <min{pB − 2ξ, pC − ξ}.
DB(pA, pB, pC) =

0, if pB >min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ},
1, if min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ}< pB <min{pA + 2ξ, pC + ξ},
2, if min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ}< pB <min{pA− ξ, pC + ξ},
3, if pB <min{pA− ξ, pC − 2ξ}.
DC(pA, pB, pC) =

0, if pC >min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ},
1, if min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ}< pC <min{pA + ξ, pB + 2ξ},
2, if min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}< pC <min{pA + ξ, pB − ξ},
3, if pC <min{pA− 2ξ, pB − ξ}.
From these expressions, we see that if the prices were set so that pA = pB = pC , each product will get 1
customer who is most favorably predisposed, and that customer is less likely to switch to another product
when ambiguity ξ increases. This is illustrated in Figure A-1. 
	

		





 	
	

		

	

		






	

		

Figure A-1 Illustration of demand curve DA(pA, pB , pC) when pB = pC . When min{pB + ξ, pC − ξ} < pA <
min{pB + ξ, pC + 2ξ}, demand is less responsive to price changes for higher levels of ambiguity ξ.
In the example above, the three customers’ predispositions from each firm’s viewpoint, are distributed as
follows (maintaining consistent order of comparison, i.e., A compares with B then C; B compares with C
then A; C compares with A then B):
customer 1 customer 2 customer 3
Firm A: (ΩA−ΩB, ΩA−ΩC)∈
{
(−1,−2), (2,1), (−1,1)
}
,
Firm B: (ΩB −ΩC , ΩB −ΩA)∈
{
(−1,1), (−1,−2), (2,1)
}
,
Firm C: (ΩC −ΩA, ΩC −ΩB)∈
{
(2,1), (−1,1), (−1,−2)
}
.
In other words, the 3 customers’ relative preferences are distributed in an identical manner for all three
firm’s viewpoint. In other words, the distribution are identical. We next extend this notion of symmetry for
continuous mass of consumer population.
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A.3. Extension to continuous mass of consumer population
Recall that customer i will purchase product A (and not B or C) if and only if
qA− pA−Ωi,Aξ > qB − pB −Ωi,Bξ, and qA− pA−Ωi,Aξ > qC − pC −Ωi,Cξ.
Equivalently, if and only if
ΩAB , (Ωi,A−Ωi,B)< (qA− qB)− (pA− pB)
ξ
and ΩAC , (Ωi,A−Ωi,C)< (qA− qC)− (pA− pC)
ξ
.
Let us normalize the demand to 1, and have hA(ΩAB,ΩAC) denote the probability mass of consumers from
firm A’s point of view. Similarly, hB(ΩBC ,ΩBA) and hC(ΩCA,ΩCB) denote the probability mass of consumers
from firm B and C’s perspective respectively.
All consumers i’s that satisfy both inequalities above will purchase product A. Thus, the demand for
product A is
DA(pA, pB, pC) =
∫ (qA−qB)−(pA−pB)
ξ
−∞
∫ (qA−qC )−(pA−pC )
ξ
−∞
hA(ΩAB,ΩAC)dΩABdΩAC
= HA
(
(qA− qB)− (pA− pB)
ξ
,
(qA− qC)− (pA− pC)
ξ
)
.
This is visualized in Figure A-2. Similarly, we have
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the cdf of firm i.
All consumers i’s that satisfy both inequalities above will purchase product A. Thus, the demand
for product A is therefore
DA(pA|pB, pC) =
Z  (pA pB)
⇠
 1
Z  (pA pC )
⇠
 1
hA(⌦AB,⌦AC)d⌦ABd⌦AC
= HA
✓ (pA  pB)
⇠
,
 (pA  pC)
⇠
◆
,
Omega_AB	
Omega_AC	
H(u,v)	
Purchase	Product	A	
Figure 1 Visual illustration of demand curve DA
Similarly, we have
DB(pB|pA, pC) = HB
✓ (pB   pA)
⇠
,
 (pB   pC)
⇠
◆
,
1
Figure 1 Visual illustration of demand curve DA(pA|pB , pC). Note that as pA increases, the region shrinks both
horizontally and vertically. Thus, we will see later that when we take derivative with respect to pA it
will involve the sum of two partial derivatives.
Similarly, we have
DB(pB|pA, pC) = HB
✓ (pB   pA)
⇠
,
 (pB   pC)
⇠
◆
,
1
Figure A-2 Visual illustration of demand curve DA(pA, pB , pC). Note that as pA increases, the region shrinks
both horizontally and vertically. Thus, we will see later that when we take derivative with respect to
pA it will involve the sum of two partial derivatives.
DB(pA, pB, pC) = HB
(
(qB − qC)− (pB − pC)
ξ
,
(qB − qA)− (pB − pA)
ξ
)
,
DC(pA, pB, pC) = HC
(
(qC − qA)− (pC − pA)
ξ
,
(qC − qB)− (pC − pB)
ξ
)
.
We next present the equilibrium result for the special case of symmetric competition, where all firms have
equal qualities and no firm has a predisposition advantage (i.e., they are similarly situated products).
Corollary A.1 (Symmetric Competition). Suppose that qA = qB = qC, and hA(ΩAB,ΩAC),
hB(ΩBC ,ΩBA), and hC(ΩCA,ΩCB) are identically distributed. Then
p∗A = p
∗
B = p
∗
C =
ξ
3h(0,0)
, D∗A =D
∗
B =D
∗
C =
1
3
.
The expression is easily generalized to n firms, where for each firm j, p∗j =
ξ
nh(0)
, D∗j =
1
n
.
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Appendix B: Presence of Loyal Customers: Asymmetric Case
To make intuition precise for the asymmetric case, we suppose that predispositions are uniformly distributed
in Ω∈ [−x+K,x+K]. Using the uniform distribution for H, we have
DA(pA, pB) =
`A + (1− `A− `B)
[(
(qA−qB)−(pA−pB)
2xξ
)
+
(
x−K
2x
)]
if pA ≤ p¯A,
0 + (1− `A− `B)
[(
(qA−qB)−(pA−pB)
2xξ
)
+
(
x−K
2x
)]
if pA > p¯A.
DB(pA, pB) =
`B + (1− `A− `B)
[
1−
(
(qA−qB)−(pA−pB)
2xξ
)
− (x−K
2x
)]
if pB ≤ p¯B,
0 + (1− `A− `B)
[
1−
(
(qA−qB)−(pA−pB)
2xξ
)
− (x−K
2x
)]
if pB > p¯B.
Let, p0∗A ≡ ∆Q3 +
(
x− K
3
)
ξ and p0∗B ≡−∆Q3 +
(
x+ K
3
)
ξ denote the equilibrium prices without loyal customers
(i.e., when lA = lB = 0) as in Corollary 2. Provided that the loyal customers have higher thresholds than the
equilibrium market price, we have the following equilibrium prices with loyal customers.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that h(Ω) = 1/2x, with Ω∈ [−x+K, x+K] for some K and some x> 0, and
that the degree of ambiguity ξ > 0. If p¯A > p
0∗
A and p¯B > p
0∗
B , then
(i) if p¯A ≤ 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ & p¯B ≤ 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ,
(p∗A, p
∗
B) =
( (
x
[
1
3
+
2
3
(
1 + lA
1− lA− lB
)]
− K
3
)
ξ+
∆Q
3
,
(
x
[
1
3
+
2
3
(
1 + lB
1− lA− lB
)]
+
K
3
)
ξ− ∆Q
3
)
;
(ii) if p¯A ≤ 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ & p¯B > 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ,
(p∗A, p
∗
B) =
(
p¯A,
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ
2
− ∆Q− p¯A
2
)
;
(iii) if p¯A > 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
(
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
)
+K
)
ξ & p¯B ≤ 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ,
(p∗A, p
∗
B) =
( (
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ
2
+
∆Q+ p¯B
2
, p¯B
)
;
(iv) if p¯A > 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ & p¯B > 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ,
(p∗A, p
∗
B) = (p¯A, p¯B).
We notice that having loyal customers has the effect of scaling the value of x. From the expressions, we can
also see that the equilibrium prices (p∗A, p
∗
B) increases from (p
0∗
A , p
0∗
B ) to (p¯A, p¯B) as lA, lB, or both increase.
Moreover, for any level of loyal customers (lA, lB), (p
∗
A, p
∗
B) is nondecreasing in ambiguity ξ.
Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Corollary A.1. We will first derive the best response prices for each firms, and then the equilib-
rium prices. Firms will, by changing prices, maximize pADA(pA, pB, pC) = pAHA
(
−(pA−pB)
ξ
, −(pA−pC)
ξ
)
. By
taking first-order conditions, the profit maximizing price pA is one that satisfies the expression,
∂
{
pAHA
(
−(pA−pB)
ξ
, −(pA−pC)
ξ
)}
∂pA
=HA
(−(pA− pB)
ξ
,
−(pA− pC)
ξ
)
+
pA∂
{
HA
(
−(pA−pB)
ξ
, −(pA−pC)
ξ
)}
∂pA
= 0
⇔− 1
pA
=
d
dpA
{
HA
(
−(pA−pB)
ξ
, −(pA−pC)
ξ
)}
HA
(
−(pA−pB)
ξ
, −(pA−pC)
ξ
) .
Authors’ names blinded for peer review
Article submitted to Marketing Science; manuscript no. MKSC-15-0271.R2 11
Figure C-1 Three profit curves that result in three different expressions for optimal (profit-maximizing) prices.
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Similarly, we have − 1
pB
=
d
dpB
{
HB
(−(pB−pC )
ξ
,
−(pB−pA)
ξ
)}
HB
(−(pB−pC )
ξ
,
−(pB−pA)
ξ
) , and − 1
pC
=
d
dpC
{
HC
(−(pC−pA)
ξ
,
−(pC−pB)
ξ
)}
HC
(−(pC−pA)
ξ
,
−(pC−pB)
ξ
) .
The best responses of three firms result in three equations and three unknowns. The solution to this system
of equations correspond to the unique equilibrium prices, which we show next. Notice first that because
HA =HB =HC , and by symmetry, pA = pB = pC . So the three equations become:
− 1
pA
=
−hA(0,0)/ξ
HA (0,0)
, − 1
pB
=
−hB(0,0)/ξ
HB (0,0)
, and− 1
pC
=
−hC(0,0)/ξ
HC (0,0)
.
Since −hA(0,0)/ξ =−hB(0,0)/ξ =−hC(0,0)/ξ, it follows that HA(0,0)pA =
HB(0,0)
pB
= HC(0,0)
pC
.
We next solve for HA. Utilizing the fact that HC = 1−HA −HB, we have (i) HApA =
HB
pB
, and (ii) HB
pB
=
1−HA−HB
pC
. Solving for expression (ii), we have HB
(
1
pB
+ 1
pC
)
= 1−HA
pC
⇔ HB
(
pB+pC
pB
)
= (1−HA) ⇔ HB =
pB
pB+pC
(1−HA). Substituting this expression back into (i), we get
HA
pA
=
1−HA
pB + pC
⇔ HA(pB + pC) = pA− pAHA ⇔ HA = pA
pA + pB + pC
.
Similarly, we have HB =
pB
pA+pB+pC
, andHC =
pC
pA+pB+pC
. Since, pA = pB = pC in equilibrium, we have that
HA =HB =HC =
1
3
. To find the expressions for the prices, we revisit the first-order equations and plug in
the values for Hi, and we have pA = pB = pC =
ξ
3h(0,0)
. 
Proof of Proposition B.1. We first begin by deriving the following expressions for the best-response prices.
Given price pB (resp. pA) of firm B (resp. firm A), the best response prices of firm A (resp. firm B) p
∗
A(pB)
(p∗B(pA)) is given by (∆Q= qA− qB),
p∗A(pB) =

xξlA
1−lA−lB +
ξ(x−K)
2
+ ∆Q+pB
2
, pB < 2p¯A−∆Q− (x−K)ξ− 2xξlA1−lA−lB ,
p¯A, pB ∈ 2p¯A−∆Q− (x−K)ξ+
[
− 2xξlA
1−lA−lB , 2
√
2xξlAp¯A
1−lA−lB
]
,
ξ(x−K)
2
+ ∆Q+pB
2
, pB > 2p¯A−∆Q− (x−K)ξ+ 2
√
2xξlAp¯A
1−lA−lB
p∗B(pA) =

xξlB
1−lA−lB +
ξ(x+K)
2
+ pA−∆Q
2
, pA < 2p¯B + ∆Q− (x+K)ξ− 2xξlB1−lA−lB ,
p¯B, pA ∈ 2p¯B + ∆Q− (x+K)ξ+
[
− 2xξlB
1−lA−lB , 2
√
2xξlB p¯B
1−lA−lB
]
,
ξ(x+K)
2
+ pA−∆Q
2
, pA > 2p¯B + ∆Q− (x+K)ξ+ 2
√
2xξlB p¯B
1−lA−lB
A discontinuous drop occurs when the price exceeds the willingness-to-pay, p¯i, of the loyal customers. This
can occur in three different points (see Figure C-1), leading to three different expressions for the optimal
price. After finding the expressions for the optimal prices in each case, we identify the conditions for each
case.
First, we take the first order condition of pi`A(pA, pB) ≡ pADA(pA, pB) for the expression when pA ≤ p¯A.
This corresponds to the case when the loyal customers have high willingness-to-pay so that the firm can
maximize assuming that it will retain the loyal customers. For this case, we have
Authors’ names blinded for peer review
12 Article submitted to Marketing Science; manuscript no. MKSC-15-0271.R2
pADA(pA, pB) = pAlA + pA(1− lA− lB)
(
∆Q/ξ+ (x−K) + pB/ξ
2x
− pA
2xξ
)
.
Taking the first-order conditions, we have
∂pADA(pA, pB)
∂pA
= 0 ⇔ lA + (1− lA− lB)
(
∆Q/ξ+ (x−K) + pB/ξ
2x
− pA
2xξ
)
− (pA(1− lA− lB)
2xξ
= 0
⇔ lA + (1− lA− lB)
(
∆Q/ξ+ (x−K) + pB/ξ
2x
− pA
2xξ
)
=
(pA(1− lA− lB)
2xξ
⇔ lA + (1− lA− lB)
(
∆Q/ξ+ (x−K) + pB/ξ
2x
)
=
(pA(1− lA− lB)
xξ
⇔ pl∗A =
xξlA
1− lA− lB +
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
.
This condition when p∗A = p
l∗
A occurs when,
pA ≤ p¯A ⇔ xξlA
1− lA− lB +
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
≤ p¯A ⇔ pB ≤ 2p¯A−∆Q− (x−K)ξ− 2xξlA
1− lA− lB .
Similarly, the first order conditions of pi0A(pA, pB)≡ pADA(pA, pB) for the expression when pA > p¯A, cor-
responding to the case when all the loyal customers have low willingness-to-pay and the firm can maximize
assuming that it will not retain the loyal customers. This is,
p0∗A =
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
.
The condition when p∗A = p
0∗
A occurs when p¯A is small, specifically when pi
0
A(p
0∗
A , pB)> pi
l
A(p¯A, pB). We first
evaluate pi0A(p
0∗
A , pB) and then pi
l
A(p¯A, pB).
pi0A(p
0∗
A , pB) = p
0∗
A (1− lA− lB)
[
1
2x
(
∆Q+ pB − p0∗A
ξ
)
+
(
x−K
2x
)]
= p0∗A (1− lA− lB)
[
1
2xξ
(
∆Q+ pB −
(
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
))
+
(
x−K
2x
)]
= p0∗A (1− lA− lB)
[
1
2xξ
(
∆Q+ pB
2
)
−
(
x−K
4x
)
+
(
x−K
2x
)]
= p0∗A
(1− lA− lB)
2xξ
[
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
]
=
(1− lA− lB)
2xξ
(p0∗A )
2;
pilA(p¯A, pB) = p¯AlA + p¯A(1− lA− lB)
(
∆Q+ pB
2xξ
+
(x−K)ξ
2xξ
− p¯A
2xξ
)
= p¯AlA + p¯A
1− lA− lB
xξ
(
∆Q+ pB
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
− p¯A
2
)
= p¯AlA + p¯A
1− lA− lB
xξ
(
p0∗A −
p¯A
2
)
.
We have that,
pi0A(p
0∗
A , pB) = pi
l
A(p¯A, pB) ⇔
(1− lA− lB)
2xξ
(p0∗A )
2 = p¯AlA + p¯A
1− lA− lB
xξ
(
p0∗A −
p¯A
2
)
⇔ p¯AlA + p¯A 1− lA− lB
xξ
(
p0∗A −
p¯A
2
)
− (1− lA− lB)
2xξ
(p0∗A )
2 = 0
⇔ p¯2A
(
1− lA− lB
2xξ
)
− p¯A
(
lA +
(
1− lA− lB
xξ
)
p0∗A
)
+
(
1− lA− lB
2xξ
)
(p0∗A )
2 = 0
⇔ p¯2A− p¯A
(
2lAxξ
1− lA− lB + 2p
0∗
A
)
+ (p0∗A )
2 = 0
Applying the quadratic equation, we have
p¯A =
xξlA
1− lA− lB + p
0∗
A −
1
2
√(
2lAxξ
1− lA− lB + 2p
0∗
A
)2
− 4(p0∗A )2 = pl∗A −
√
(pl∗A )2− (p0∗A )2
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We want to find pB that makes this equality hold. So,
p¯A = p
l∗
A −
√
(pl∗A )2− (p0∗A )2 ⇔
√
(pl∗A )2− (p0∗A )2 = pl∗A − p¯A ⇔ (pl∗A )2− (p0∗A )2 = (pl∗A − p¯A)2
⇔−(p0∗A )2 =−2pl∗A p¯A + p¯2A ⇔ (p0∗A )2− 2pl∗A p¯A + p¯2A = 0 ⇔ (p0∗A )2− 2
(
xξlA
1− lA− lB + p
0∗
A
)
p¯A + p¯
2
A = 0
⇔ (p0∗A )2− 2p¯Ap0∗A +
[
p¯2A−
(
2xξlA
1− lA− lB
)
p¯A
]
= 0.
Applying the quadratic equation with respect to p0∗A , we have
p0∗A =
1
2
(
2p¯A +
√
4p¯2A− 4
[
p¯2A−
(
2xξlA
1− lA− lB
)
p¯A
])
= p¯A +
√(
2xξlA
1− lA− lB
)
p¯A.
Since p0∗A =
∆Q
2
+ (x−K)ξ
2
+ pB
2
, solving for pB we have
∆Q
2
+
(x−K)ξ
2
+
pB
2
= p¯A +
√(
2xξlA
1− lA− lB
)
p¯A ⇔ pB = 2p¯A−∆Q− (x−K)ξ+ 2
√(
2xξlA
1− lA− lB
)
p¯A.
Thus, when pB > 2p¯A −∆Q− (x−K)ξ + 2
√(
2xξlA
1−lA−lB
)
p¯A, firm A is better off setting price as if loyal
segment does not exist.
Finally there are cases where it is beneficial for firm to charge a price pA = p¯A so as to retain the loyal
customers. In this case, the firm is better off maximizing the benefit from all the loyal customers rather than
optimizing the profit without the loyal segment of consumers. This occurs when pB is in between these two
thresholds. Thus, we have the best response expression for p∗A(pB). The best response expression for p
∗
B(pA)
can be found in a similar manner.
Given the best response curves, the equilibrium prices (p∗A, p
∗
B) will occur at the fixed point. There are four
possible fixed points that can occur, as shown in the next Figure. The curve containing slope 1/2 denotes
the best response of firm B given price pA. The curve containing slope 2 denotes the best response of firm A
given price pB.
The four cases occur, according to when the infliction occurs in the best response functions, i.e., based on
whether or not
p¯A ≶ 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ, and p¯B ≶ 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ.
(i) If p¯A ≤ 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lB
1−lA−lB
]
+K
)
ξ and p¯B ≤ 2p¯A −∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lA
1−lA−lB
]
−K
)
ξ, then the
crossing occurs when the line with slope 1/2 intersects the line with slope 2 (upper left panel of the Figure C-
2). Solving for the intersecting point,
pA =
xξlA
1− lA− lB +
ξ(x−K)
2
+
∆Q+ pB
2
=
xξlA
1− lA− lB +
ξ(x−K)
2
+
∆Q
2
+
1
2
(
xξlB
1− lA− lB +
ξ(x+K)
2
− ∆Q
2
+
pA
2
)
,
3
4
pA =
xξ
1− lA− lB
(
lA +
lB
2
)
+
3
4
ξx− 3
4
K +
∆Q
4
,
pA =
(
2xξ
1− lA− lB
)(
2
3
lA +
1
3
lB
)
+
(
x− K
3
)
ξ+
∆Q
3
=
(
x
[
1
3
+
2
3
(
1 + lA
1− lA− lB
)]
− K
3
)
ξ+
∆Q
3
.
Plugging in the expression for pA into the expression for best response pB(pA), we have
pB =
xξlB
1− lA− lB +
ξ(x+K)
2
− ∆Q
2
+
pA
2
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Figure C-2 Four possible fixed points. Parameters: p¯A = p¯B = 15, lA = lB = 0.15, x= 5, ∆Q= 0; ξ = 3.5 (upper
left), ξ = 1.75 (rest); K = 0 (upper left and lower right), ∆K =−5 (lower left), K = 5 (upper right).
=
xξlB
1− lA− lB +
ξ
2
(x+K)− ∆Q
2
+
1
2
((
2xξ
1− lA− lB
)(
2
3
lA +
1
3
lB
)
+
(
x− K
3
)
ξ+
∆Q
3
)
=
xξ
1− lA− lB
(
4
3
lB +
2
3
lA
)
+xξ+
ξK
2
− ξK
6
−∆Q
(
1
2
− 1
6
)
=
(
2xξ
1− lA− lB
)(
2
3
lB +
1
3
lA
)
+
(
x+
K
3
)
ξ− ∆Q
3
=
(
x
[
1
3
+
2
3
(
1 + lB
1− lA− lB
)]
+
K
3
)
ξ− ∆Q
3
.
(ii) If p¯A ≤ 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lB
1−lA−lB
]
+K
)
ξ and p¯B > 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lA
1−lA−lB
]
−K
)
ξ, then the
crossing occurs when the line with slope 1/2 intersects the vertical line (upper right panel of the Figure C-2).
Clearly, p∗A = p¯A, and
p∗B = pB(p¯A) =
xξlB
1− lA− lB +
ξ
2
(x+K)− ∆Q
2
+
p¯A
2
=
(
x
[
1 +
2lB
1− lA− lB
]
+K
)
ξ
2
− ∆Q− p¯A
2
.
(iii) If p¯A > 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lB
1−lA−lB
]
+K
)
ξ and p¯B ≤ 2p¯A−∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lA
1−lA−lB
]
−K
)
ξ, then the
crossing occurs when the line with slope 2 intersects the horizontal line (lower left panel of the Figure C-2).
Clearly, p∗B = p¯B, and
p∗A = pA(p¯B) =
xξlA
1− lA− lB +
ξ
2
(x−K) + ∆Q
2
+
p¯B
2
=
(
x
[
1 +
2lA
1− lA− lB
]
−K
)
ξ
2
+
∆Q+ p¯B
2
.
(iv) Finally, if p¯A > 2p¯B + ∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lB
1−lA−lB
]
+K
)
ξ and p¯B > 2p¯A −∆Q−
(
x
[
1 + 2lA
1−lA−lB
]
−K
)
ξ,
then the crossing occurs when the vertical line intersects the horizontal line (lower right panel of the Figure C-
2). In this case, p∗A = p¯A and p
∗
B = p¯B. 
